Comments on Professors Johnson's and Weiss's Papers by Hadreas, Peter
COMMENTS ON PROFESSORS JOHNSON'S
AND WEISS'S PAPERS
In my eomments on Professor Johnson paper, WPainting,
Nostalgia and Metaphysies: Merleau-Ponty's Line," I'm going to
take the issue of whether Merleau-Ponty favors representative or
figurative painting over abstract art as elosed. I think Professor
Johnson shows Merleau-Ponty not to be guilty of that partieular
viee. Professor Johnson does so in different ways, but most
obviously in point of fact by reeounting Merleau-Ponty's aetual
eitations of paintings in "The Eye and the Mind" partieularly in the
earlier Art de Franee edition.
I will instead address Professor Johnson's defense of
Merleau-Ponty's nostalgia. To my mind, there are two very
revealing statements made by Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard in one of the
essays whieh is key to the Merleau-PontylLyotard debate. The two
statements are both quoted by Professor Johnson, but they are
worth returning to. The first statement is, quoting Lyotard, in
"Philosophy and Painting in the Age of their Experimentation:
Contribution to an Idea of Post modernity: W
The arroganee of philosophers is metaphysies. This
arroganee, Lyotard extends to Merleau-Ponty even in his writings on
painting sinee, as Lyotard would have it, Merleau-Ponty's
semiologieal deck contains eards that exhibit metaphysical suits.
Aeeording to Lyotard, we get a peek at Merleau-Ponty's eards even
in "The Eye and the Mind" beeause Merleau-Ponty favors Cezanne
and Giaeometti over Duchamp, Marey and the ellbists. The hidden
premise here is that Cezanne and Giaeometti would give us a
representation or at least a figuration of how things really are. They
privilege the being of things, of "Mt. Sainte Vietoire," of wThe Blue
Vase" or for that matter of "The Cardplayers,Wfor example in the
ease of Cezanne. But Professor Lyotard also says of Merleau-Ponty:
"[he is) one of the least arrogant of philosophers," (ibid). Professor
Johnson addresses these ineompatible statements of Lyotard by
telling us--and I think he does so very instruetively--that in "The Eye
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and the Mind" and also in the late work, posthumously entitled "The
Visible and the Invisible, • that Merleau-Ponty giv8S us the germs of
a ·postmodern metaphysic.· I think this intriguing encapsulization
is worth developing, even in only -these few minutes of comments.
We can thank Lyotard, along with others--with Derrida and
Kristeva to mention only some of the most influential--for exposing
semiologically the many transgressions of metaphysicalizing. Let
me cite a very partial roll call of some of the deadlier transgressions
of metaphysicalizing:
First, metaphysicalizing tends to position one category of
Being over another. Thus schools of philosophy from Existentialism
to Pragmatism, for example, all secretly promote subjectivity to a
prominence which aids and abets everything from hyper-
individualism to cultural autism. fostered by the mass media, so it's
been argued.
Second, metaphysicalizing leads one to seek after essences.
One misguidely seeks to establish what something is as such, and,
consequently ons engenders beliefs about what is normal and
proper in a persons or things. This, so it is argued, can promote
biases of many sorts, which include everything from Eurocentricism
to a justification for the vivisection of animals.
Third, it's been argued that metaphysicalizing can privilege
a single language, most scandalously Greek, or German, or perhaps
Sanskrit, over. and above other language's because, for whatever
reasons' other languages, so it's claimed, don't accommodate
themselves to the evocation of Being.
Fourth, metaphysicalizing can promote a particular
profession or calling. For better or worse, it can promoteperhaps
poets, perhaps set-theoreticians, or perhaps artificial intelligence
computer software hackers. (In the case of the poets at least, it
doesn't seem that the National Endowment for the Humanities has
got the message. Yet, maybe that's changing.)
The deconstruction of metaphysics by Derrida and Lyotard
among others, even as this short list would indicate, has provided
an invaluable service. However, as Professor Johnson points out,
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at least in relation to Merleau-Ponty one may speak of "the germ of
a postmodern metaphysie," and I would add a elearly non-arrogant
one.
A think Professor Johnson is fundamentally right about this
"germ of postmodern metaphysie," Let me itemize in somewhat
different terms from his, why., in the ease of Merleau-Ponty,
metaphysicaJizing does not seem to amount to metaphysieal
arrogance.
First, Merleau-Ponty does not privilege a particular category
of being over another. As early as the Phenomenology of
Perception, where Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body-world system
as neither in-itself nor. for-itself but as a for-itself-for-us
(Phenomenology of Perception, p. 372 Fr. ed., p. 322 Eng. eg.),
Merleau-Ponty is dedicated to promoting neither subjectivity over
objectivity nor the eonverse. Rather he sets out to propose a
eoupling, or paet (s'8ccoupler) from whieh they both emerge. In the
writings he was oceupied with at his death, this projeet of
promoting neither subject nor objeet, essence nor fact, becomes
even ·more focal. The description of the self-world interrelation,
what he refers to as "the chiasma or intertwining," leads to
metaphysical positions only through introdueing various partite and
distorting revisions. There is nothing here of the privileging of one
metaphysical category over another.
Second, I think it is a misreading of the later Merleau-Ponty
to hold his notion of Flesh to be areturn to essentialism. Flesh
enables Merleau-Ponty to describe how beings offer themselves in
fullness; it is not a conceptualization of whst beings are. Flesh, it
can be shown, is a way of designating the way in which the visible
and the invisible, the actual and the imaginary are co-present in
something whieh we hold be fully there.
And last, I think one can go quite a way to show that
Merleau-Ponty avoids privileging a particular language, or for that
matter an idiolect, because his concern is often a pre-v~rbal ·world.
To return to the late essay on painting again, in the "The Eye and
the Mind," Merleau-Ponty holds that the painter recaptures an ante-
predicative world. As such metaphysics must be, at least,
retrospective. "The impalpable souree of sensations" which
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rengages the painter is neither real nor ideal, private or public,
neither party to Sameness nor party to Otherness. To be sure, a
description of this world which Merleau-Ponty sometimes refers to
as Brute Being, (/'Etre slluvIIge), rnay allow metaphysical bias to
enter in. However, since the world of the painter is ante-
metaphyical, descriptions involving metaphysical predicates would
self-referentially cancel themselves out, becoming at best heuristic
and finally irrelevant.
Time permitting, if I may, I'd also like to make a short
comment on Professor Weiss instructive paper. •Ambiguity,
Absurdity and Reversibility: Indeterminacy in de Beauvoir, Camus
and Merleau-Ponty.· Professor Weiss's paper shows us the manner
in which Camus, de Beauvoir and Merleau~Ponty, in fact, expand
upon the equivoc8tion of the notion of indeterminacy. The universe
is indifferent to the Camus of The Myth ofSisyphus. Indeterminacy
for the early Camus means a confrontation with wtiat is
irrepressibly, and implacably, non-human. Indeterminacy for de
Beauvoir of the Ethics of Ambiguity means the good ambiguity that
leads us to make indistinct subject and object. It is a moral
indistinction. Finally with Merleau-Ponty, indeterminacy, at least
that which concerns the reversibility of the body, the hand which
touches, readies itself to be touched, etc., counts as a rhythm or
oscillation between subject and object. If nothing else certainly
these appropriations, even distortions, of the notion of
indeterminacy 8111 Husserl, suggests how the arrabiguity--or perhaps
better, how the the multivocslity of a term--would seem to antedate
thought, even as it prepares it and makes it possible.
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